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On 9 August, an 18-year old, unarmed black teenager with no previous criminal record 
was shot six times by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The outrage at this event 
stems from two things: that he was black and that it was a police officer who shot and 
killed him. Michael Brown, as the civil rights veteran Al Sharpton said at his funeral, 
‘wants to be remembered as the one who made America deal with how we are going to 
police in the United States’ (McGreal and Carroll: 2014). But he will likely be 
remembered for a riot. The days following the shooting saw protests and ‘violent clashes’ 
between the protestors and police – with people throwing glass bottles, looting 
businesses, burning down the local QuickTrip gas station and vandalising vehicles. The 
state response was to form blockades of police in riot gear using tear gas, Missouri 
Governor Jay Nixon declared a state of emergency and imposed midnight curfews by 18 
August when the riots showed to be continuing and, on seeing that these failed to 
control the violence, activated the Missouri National Guard to support police operations 
(the first time that the military has been deployed to quell civil unrest since the 1992 race 
riots in Los Angeles). Over 30 arrests, on charges of assault, burglary, and theft 
happened on the night following the shooting alone – and since then these have 
increased, with 78 people being arrested following riotous behavior after a second - 
apparently unrelated - fatal shooting of another young black man, 23-year old Kajieme 
Powell, on 20 August. President Obama described, or accused, the protestors of ‘stirring 
chaos’ and of ‘giving in to anger’, which only serves to raise tension, he said (Roberts 
2014).  
 
Ah, ‘[t]he enigma of revolts’ (Foucault, 2002a: 449). It is an enigma that has two sides to 
it: how to label the event and how to understand the ēthos of the rioting chav, or thug or 
underclass. As to labels, is the sort of unruly, spontaneous, improvised behavior that took 
place in Ferguson ‘proper’ resistance (compare this event to the UK Riots of August 
2011, which had a similar impetus – the fatal police shooting of an unarmed, young black 
man – and a similar aesthetic of vandalism, looting and arson. Or to events that 
happened in Mexico less than 48 hours from my writing this in response to the news that 
43 student teachers were disappeared by the police in the Southern city of Iguala, where 
the word ‘protest’ is used in contrast to ‘peaceful demonstration’ to describe violent 
actions, Tuckman, 2014)? The aesthetic of rioting is one of improvised, spontaneous 
performance, which combines the visual (spectacle) element of aesthetic with a way of 
behaving (ēthos). It is, furthermore, a spectacle but it is not spectacular (that is, it is 
revolution but rather mundane and ‘everyday’ – see further Douzinas, 2013: 139-40). 
Ferguson is thus not the kind of spectacular protest of the Ukrainian maidan (labeled the 
Hrushevskoho Street Riots of earlier this year) or the Central business district in Hong 
Kong (where the ‘Umbrella Movement/Revolution’, contesting exclusionary electoral 
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reforms since September 2014, continues to unfold). It is certainly not the type of 
‘historical riot’ that teases out change and revolution (Badiou, 2012: 35-8). Nor is it the 
more civilized and thereby more politically palatable form of expression of frustration as 
the occupation of public, urban space that is the Occupy Movements. Not being able, by 
a comparison, to label the unruly event as resistance means the event becomes labeled 
instead as only ‘stirring chaos’, or as only ‘criminality pure and simple’ (Cameron’s 
description of the 2011 UK Riots) or only ‘abstract negativity’ (Zizek, 2011). The riot is 
thus apolitical and only criminal. However, we see a new way of reading political 
expression if we look beyond a ‘resistance’ framework and see the performance of 
struggle that took place in Ferguson as counter-conduct. That is, behavior that counters 
the form of being governed in that way. A way of behaving that refuses, or struggles 
against, conducting power – which in this scenario (similar to London in 2011 and so 
many other unruly events dating back to the momentous May 1968 student protests in 
France) is police power. How then to understand the ēthos of this behavior? The rioters 
become stripped of political agency and their behavior criminalized. Yet, as rights-
bearing citizens they are exercising the ‘new right’, the ethical (rather than juridical) right 
to ‘stand up and speak to those in power’ in an attempt to alleviate suffering (Foucault, 
2002b). This new right represents an ethics of the self which, when applied to the private 
individuals in Ferguson, hints that refusing the form of being conducted through looting, 
arson and vandalism might be an exercise of parrhēsia allowing individuals to refuse 
suffering and refuse governments that have neglected to recognize the social situation of 
poverty and disaffection in which they are forced to live. 
 
The Ferguson events were not then a ‘giving in’ to anger but an ethical and acceptable 
response to a form of conducting power that it was no longer proper to obey. ‘The police 
were the problem, and they had to be stopped’ (Stephens, 2014). Ferguson is largely an 
African-American community – about two thirds of the city’s 21,100 residents are black. 
The police force has 53 members and, strikingly disproportionately, only three of the 
officers are black. The Washington Post reports that relations between residents have been 
‘very hostile’ (quoting a local resident) for years – everybody, for instance, has been a 
victim of DWB [‘driving while black’] (Lowery et al, 2014). What does this show? It 
shows calling the event a riot, determining that the protestors are ‘stirring chaos’ and 
declaring that their anger is misdirected is not enough. It is not enough because it ignores 
the nature of this as a political event and denies political agency to the protestors, 
dismissing them instead as irrational and apolitical. The rioters, I suggest, can instead be 
seen as parrhēsiasts, who engage in fearless speech and truth-telling about the pain and 
fear of an entire community as perpetuated by the lying rhetorician, who is represented 
by the state (specifically the police)? They fulfill the conditions of parrhēsia, as risk and 
courage (Foucault, 2011; Foucault, 2001); they risk excessive punitive response from the 
state in the form of arrests (and disproportionately high criminal sentences as we saw in 
the judicial response to the UK Riots) and military presence and so are courageous in 
expressing their disaffection. Perhaps they do not fulfill the condition of being the 
‘decent people’ (‘khrēstroi’) who deliberate and take decisions within the city – perhaps 
they are more akin to the the mad, the insane, who are not even given the right to speak. 
What then of the activists and leaders from the New Black Panthers, the Nation of 
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Islam, Christian Groups such as Disciples of Justice, and known civil rights campaigners 
such as Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton who took part – can they speak the truth? Could 
not the looters, protestors, bystanders in Ferguson be likened to the spontaneous, 
improvising ‘tellers’ of (Playback) theatre (Fox, 2003) – since they take on a raw, ‘animal-
like’ persona to tell the truth, the story of their community? The story being that policing 
in Missouri, in the United States, uses excessive force against rights-bearing citizens and 
that we will not stand for this. Much like the actors of non-scripted theatre, they are 
acting in collaboration and alone – they must be able to be good group members or else 
the whole performance will not work. And as a performance the riot is, far from being 
only ‘abstract’ and ‘chaotic’, acted out according to certain rules (where to meet, what 
posters to hold, how to communicate).  
 
The ‘enigma of revolts’ is thus made easier to understand through a counter-conduct 
framework, which presents a new way of reading political expression. Counter-conduct 
reveals an ethical form of behavior – so, the events in Ferguson reveal an ethical position 
towards conducting (police) power. It is an ēthos that is characterized by the free speech 
of the courageous truth-teller, even where that individual is a black citizen from a low-
income background (or a ‘chav’ or ‘mindless thug’, as the rioters in London have been 
labeled). The challenge is to recognize the behavior of animal-like, spontaneous 
performers with rights as political acts and not dismiss them and thus the story of their 
communities as purely criminal or ‘abnormal’. 
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